Feb 01, 2026
3 min read
The recent removal of the military leadership by Xi Jinping reaffirms the Communist Party's primacy over the state structure and has reached its highest degree of centralization since 1978 and its most effective control over state, military and society since the death of Mao.
Keys To China's Top Army Layoffs: Party Regulation The Rost
Xi Jinping capped a cycle that began in 2015 with the biggest overhaul of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) since 1950. The latest move was this week's dismissal of Zhang Youxia, first vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Liu Zhenli, chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.The main purpose of this exercise, from the beginning, was nothing but to broadcast its structure;that is, to strengthen the judgment.Chinese Communist Party (CCP) towards the Armed Forces.
En efecto, desde la llegada al poder en 2012, Xi Jinping enarboló la bandera del fortalecimiento del liderazgo del PCCh en todos los órdenes. Su primer enfoque se centró en las estructuras del Estado. Cualquier debate acerca de la separación del Estado-Partido, vigente con altibajos desde los años 80, fue finiquitado de plano.
En su lugar, se acentuó la presencia del Partido en todas las estructuras del aparato estatal y se fortaleció su condición ejecutiva, reduciendo el margen de autonomía que había asumido durante el mandato de Den Xiaoping, un periodo conocido como denguismo, cuando el Partido se ocupaba de fijar la línea, pero dejando cierto margen para un despliegue holgado de capacidades gestoras.
From a historical perspective, President Xi broke the functional ambiguity that had tolerated some differences between the party and the state to facilitate economic management and administrative management in the decades since Mao Zedong.The city believes that this model was born from the disintegration of power, ideological laxity, and systemic risk.His response was not to return to classical Maoism, but rather to build a highly modernized state, but to an organically dependent party where technical efficiency took precedence.He doesn't question politics.
Xi ignores the practical ambiguity that emerged in the post-Mao decades, when some distinctions between party and state were allowed to facilitate economic regulation and administrative expertise.
This division also responds to the reading of the international context.In an environment perceived as hostile and unstable, Xi Jinping is committed to an alliance that can pool resources, impose discipline and maintain a long-term strategy.From this point of view, the separation between the parties is not an ideal, but a structural weakness.
Finally, it must be understood that the state does not weaken against the party, but redefines itself as its active arm, closing the circle opened by Deng Xiaoping's reforms and renewing the basic principle of the system in a modern key, i.e. the idea that the party is the core.
In the army, the party rules
The military, made more relevant by the new purges under his leadership, is perhaps the most complete laboratory for redistribution under Xi Jinping.Unlike the civilian apparatus, where technocratic inertia still persists, Xi has operated with extraordinary doctrinal clarity and political power in the military, for here the very nerve of power is at risk.
When Xi took office in 2012, of course, the military was no longer the Maoist army of the "Red Army", but a highly professional force with commanders concentrating corporate power, client networks and a culture of autonomous function.
Bajo los dos dirigentes anteriores primó la estabilidad interna y el desarrollo técnico-militar. Xi interpreta esa evolución como un riesgo estratégico ya que, en la tradición del PCCh, un Ejército eficaz, pero políticamente tibio es una contradicción peligrosa.
Since the beginning of his tenure, as has been the case with debates over the separation of state and party, Xi has avoided any call to "nationalize" the military, an idea that took hold in Chinese academia in the 1990s, reiterating the central message that the military is the party's army, not the national army in the Western sense.Xi has resolutely buried this debate, emphasizing absolute loyalty to the CCP and especially to its leading "core".
Xi aims to create a military that is ready to "fight and win wars", technologically advanced and capable of joint operations, but unable to act as an independent corporate actor.
One of the most important tools of this process is the consolidation of the responsibility system of the chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC).Although this principle exists officially, Xi has turned it into a real and personal governance mechanism.
In practice, this means that all important strategic decisions - operational, doctrinal and organizational - are concentrated in the figure of the president of the CMC, ie Xi Jinping himself.The collegial autonomy of the Supreme Command was dissolved and a vertical and political rather than a professional chain of command was established.
The major military reforms launched in 2015 pursued the twin goals of modernizing the army and abolishing the autocratic center of power.Among the most relevant changes may be the abolition of the four major Directorates General (General Staff, Politics, Transport and Weapons), which have concentrated power.huge bureaucratic;the creation of 15 departments directly under the CMC, increasing central control and reducing hierarchical neutrality;and reorganization of the territory, so that the old military areas are replaced by joint command, which limits the local command base.
The political impact sought is clear: less personal networks and greater reliance on the center of the party.
President Xi has also clearly strengthened the dual command system (commander-in-chief and political commissar), tipping the balance towards the latter.The commissar is no longer a decorative ideological figure and once again proves to be a guarantor of political legitimacy and loyalty to the party.In addition, political work will be strengthened within the unit, including calls for ideological research, loyalty oaths, party education campaigns and internal monitoring.This message suggests that military competition should never neglect political credibility.
the same as the situation The ultimate goal is not to weaken the military. but on the contrary Meaning, by making the army more capable at the operational level and less independent at the political level, Xi seeks a military that is prepared "Fight and win the War" with advanced technology and the ability to conduct joint operations. but cannot act as an independent corporate actor.
Corruption as an argument
The anti-corruption campaign plays a crucial role in redistribution.Beyond its moral or administrative dimension, it functions as a mechanism of political centralization by subjecting state personnel to party discipline and strengthening the authority of the Central Committee for Disciplinary Control, a completely partisan body that operates outside the normal judicial system.Accountability occurs first to the party and only second to the State.
The anti-corruption campaign and the freedom fighters are well represented.The fall of the former CMC Vice Chairman Zhu Caihu and Gu Boxiong had a seismic effect and no war level was beyond the party chain.Shock has now reached Zhang Yuxia, the last in a long list, and Liu Zhenli, the head of the Central Military Commission, in October of last year, nine others.It's general time
The CCP achieves its highest level of institutional centrality since 1978, and probably the greatest effective control over the state, army and society since Mao's death.
Here, the role of the Military Commission for Discipline and Control, a party organ operating outside the normal military justice system, is strengthened, emphasizing that accountability is above all political.
In addition, eleven regulations promote the proliferation of disciplinary codes and internal rules that not only express legal or neutral relations to modern governance, but also regulate the establishment of the language of modern governance.
Minimum military autonomy
In this way, Xi Jinping has taken to extremes a fundamental principle of the Chinese system that upholds the party's absolute supremacy over the rifle.Of course, the innovation is not in the idea, but in its systematic and centralized implementation, minimizing the limits of the autonomy of the military institution and its full integration into the party-state architecture.
Thus, the CCP has reached its highest level of institutional coordination since 1978 and perhaps the most effective control over the State, Army and society since Mao's death, but without the chaos or disunity of this level.
During the Deng Xiaoping era, the Chinese Communist Party served as a supreme arbitrator, setting significant limits but leaving the broad outlines of governance to the state, local governments, and technocrats.Today, the party has become the nucleus of the processes that make decisions, coordinate, supervise, and punish.The Chinese Communist Party has never been so organic.
Unlike the 80s or 90s;A state-party split or the nationalization of the military gives the unquestioned leadership of the party a way to raise itself to protect itself as much as possible from balanced weaknesses.Ultimately, the party is to separate the state and the military and protect its sustainability.
